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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before the court on defendant- 
appellant Preston Trucking Company Inc.'s appeal from an 
order of May 22, 1997, denying reconsideration of an order 
for summary judgment entered in this matter on March 25, 
1997, in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Robert Burton 
Associates Inc. Burton, a shipper, brought this action 
against Preston, a carrier, under the Carmack Amendment 
for loss of merchandise in transit.1 Preston concedes that it 
is liable to Burton and thus only damages are in dispute. 
 
The district court set forth the facts and the legal issue 
involved in its amended letter opinion of March 18, 1997, 
as follows: 
 
        The basic facts in this matter are not in dispute. 
       Preston picked up eighty-one cases of cigarette papers 
       from Burton's warehouse in West Caldwell, New Jersey, 
       on or about December 28, 1994. Those eighty-one 
       cases were not delivered to Burton's customer, Anpesil 
       Distributors, Inc., ("Anpesil") in Jersey City, New 
       Jersey. Neither Burton nor Preston can account for the 
       whereabouts of the shipment. A replacement shipment 
       of eighty-one cases of cigarette papers was delivered to 
       Anpesil and Burton received payment in full. 
 
        Preston concedes that it failed to deliver the goods. 
       Therefore, the only dispute is whether Burton's 
       damages in this case should be the market value of the 
       goods or the replacement cost of the goods. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Carmack Amendment as applicable to this appeal now appears at 
49 U.S.C. S 14706 but previously was codified at 49 U.S.C. S 11707. 
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Preston points out, in harmony with the district court's 
findings, that Anpesil paid an invoice price for the 
replacement goods which was for "the same exact price that 
Burton intended to charge for the earlier shipment." Br. at 
4. Moreover, the "replacement shipment included identical 
products in the identical quantities to the products that 
were contained in the lost shipment" and Burton's cost to 
"purchase, procure, warehouse, ship and generally in an 
all-encompassing manner service the needs of Anpesil on 
[the replacement] invoice . . . was 17,591.41."2 Br. at 4-5 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Preston asserts 
that Burton had a sufficient quantity of replacement goods 
on hand both to replace the lost goods and to fill all its 
orders from all its customers. 
 
Burton's entire statement of facts in its brief is the 
following: 
 
        Appellee, Robert Burton, is a distributor of cigarette 
       papers. Defendant, Preston Trucking is a motor 
       common carrier. Appellee, Robert Burton, Inc., had 
       sold 81 cases of cigarette papers to one of its 
       customers, Anpesil Distributors, who tendered the 
       goods to Preston for delivery to the customer and 
       Preston lost and failed to deliver the goods. As a result, 
       the customer did not pay for the goods. Plaintiff sued 
       under the `Carmack Amendment' 49 U.S.C. S 11707, 
       now 49 U.S.C. S 14706, for breach of contract of 
       carriage and the District Court properly awarded 
       damages in the amount of the invoice price. The 
       damages awarded is in the amount of $55,928.99. 
 
Br. at 1-2.3 Thus, Burton does not deny that Preston has 
stated the facts accurately. 
 
The district court in its letter opinion noted that Preston 
argued that Burton's replacement cost is the appropriate 
measure of damages. The court, however, rejected this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The actual amount was $17,591.47, app. at 212, but as a matter of 
convenience we use the figure of $17,591.41 which Preston advances. 
 
3. The invoice amount actually was for $55,928.88, app. at 209, but the 
court entered judgment for $55,928.99. In the circumstances, as a 
matter of convenience we will use the latter figure. 
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measure of damages as it regarded it as being "more 
suitable when a consignee sustains the loss and is forced 
to go into the open market at destination to procure a 
replacement for the lost or damaged property," citing 
Chicago M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 
U.S. 97, 100, 40 S.Ct. 504, 505 (1920). 
 
The district court then pointed out that Burton asserted 
that it was entitled to the market value of the goods. The 
court indicated that market value damages are awarded on 
the theory that an award of replacement costs does not 
compensate the plaintiff for "what he would have had if the 
contract [of delivery] had been performed," quoting Polaroid 
Corp. v. Schuster's Express, Inc., 484 F.2d 349, 351 (1st 
Cir. 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The court then said that "[p]laintiff is, in effect, a lost 
volume seller, as it could have sold the replacement 
shipment to a separate customer to gain a profit had the 
first shipment not been lost by defendant." The court then 
reached the following conclusion: 
 
        It is defendant's burden to come forward and show 
       that special reasons exist why the market value rule 
       should not be applied. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
       Westway Motor Freight, Inc., 949 F.2d 317, 319 (10th 
       Cir. 1991). Defendant has failed to shoulder its burden 
       in this case. Defendant has not shown that plaintiff 
       could not have earned a profit on two shipments: The 
       shipment of the lost goods, had they been delivered, 
       and the shipment of the replacement goods to a second 
       buyer. 
 
Accordingly, the court entered judgment against Preston for 
$55,928.99, the invoice value of the original (as well as of 
the second) shipment. Preston then moved for 
reconsideration but by order entered May 22, 1997, the 
district court denied this motion. Preston then appealed. 
While, as we have indicated, Preston concedes that it is 
liable to Burton, it contends its liability is limited to 
Burton's replacement costs for the 81 cases of cigarette 
papers rather than for the invoice value of the lost 
shipment. 
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Preliminarily we address a point Burton did not mention 
in its brief. As we noted above, Preston asserts that Burton 
did not lose any sales by reason of the loss of the original 
Anpesil shipment as (1) Burton replaced that shipment and 
Anpesil paid the full price for the second shipment; and (2) 
Burton filled all the orders of all its other customers as it 
had sufficient inventory to do so. Burton's attorney at oral 
argument suggested that Preston's assertions were not 
accurate and read from portions of a deposition, which 
were not included in the appendix, which he contended 
supported his argument. 
 
In a post-argument submission which Burton's attorney 
filed with our authorization, he acknowledged that the 
foregoing portions of the deposition were not submitted to 
the district court. But in the submission he referred to a 
certification of a Burton employee, Carl Ioos, submitted on 
the summary judgment proceedings which indicated that 
after the loss of the 81 cases of cigarette paper"there was 
a drastic decline in sale of our goods in the market." The 
certification then indicated that what apparently happened 
was that Burton's goods had been stolen and wereflooding 
the market "at significantly reduced prices." Accordingly, 
Ioos claimed that it was "highly probable" that Burton lost 
sales because the goods stolen from it were competing with 
Burton's products. 
 
Inasmuch as Burton did not make this argument in its 
brief, we might be justified in disregarding the certification. 
See Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 
375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994). But we are reluctant to do so 
because, as we indicated above, the district court held that 
Burton "could have sold the replacement shipment to a 
separate customer to gain a profit had the first shipment 
not been lost by defendant." Inasmuch as the Ioos 
certification supports that conclusion, the district court 
might well have been considering it when it wrote its 
opinion. Thus, in seeking an order affirming the district 
court Burton arguably, albeit rather obliquely, has 
preserved the argument based on the Ioos certification. See 
Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1544 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1033 (1998). Accordingly, we 
will exercise our discretion and will consider the Ioos 
certification. 
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On the merits we will affirm the judgment on liability but 
will vacate the judgment on damages and will remand the 
case to the district court for further proceedings. Initially in 
addressing the merits, we point out that we do not doubt 
that ordinarily when the carrier is responsible for the loss 
of the goods in transit, the shipper is entitled to recover the 
contract price from the carrier. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co. 
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 560 F.2d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 
1977). Yet the Supreme Court has recognized that the"test 
of market value is at best but a convenient means of getting 
at the loss suffered. [Thus] [i]t may be discarded and other 
more accurate means resorted to, if, for special reasons, it 
is not exact or otherwise not applicable." Illinois Cent. R. R. 
Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 64-65, 50 S.Ct. 180, 181 (1930). 
Of course, the carrier has the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that a court should deviate from the market 
value rule. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Westway Motor 
Freight, Inc., 949 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 
Preston may be able to meet that burden. Burton 
contracted with Anpesil to sell it 81 cases of cigarette 
papers for $55,928.99. It is undisputed that Anpesil paid 
Burton $55,928.99. Thus, Burton cannot claim that 
Anpesil did not pay it the contract price. Rather, Burton's 
direct monetary damages by reason of the loss of the 
original shipment were caused by its need to ship 162 
cases of cigarette papers. These damages were the 
additional expenses it incurred by reason of the loss of the 
goods in transit, i.e., $17,591.41. Consequently, if Preston 
pays Burton $17,591.41, in one sense Burton will be whole, 
as it will have received the direct benefit of its bargain with 
Anpesil. 
 
But in view of the Ioos certification the foregoing analysis 
is not complete. While it is true that Anpesil accepted and 
paid for the second shipment and that Burton was able to 
fill the orders of its other customers, according to the 
certification Burton lost sales by reason of the loss of the 
first shipment. Preston denies that the certification is 
accurate and it points to portions of the record to support 
its views. Yet in the procedural posture of this case, which 
is on appeal from an order for summary judgment, we 
cannot resolve this factual dispute. Accordingly, there is a 
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dispute as to material facts which requires us to remand 
the case to the district court for further proceedings to 
determine if Burton lost sales by reason of the loss of the 
81 cases of cigarette papers. 
 
On the remand Preston, as the carrier, will have the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that its loss of the 81 cases 
of cigarette papers did not cause Burton any loss of sales. 
If it satisfies that burden, the district court will enter 
judgment in favor of Burton against Preston for $17,591.41 
because awarding Burton the invoice price for the lost 
shipment would grant it in an unjustified windfall. But if 
Preston cannot establish that Burton did not lose any sales 
by reason of the loss of the goods, the district court will 
enter judgment against Preston for $55,928.99, the invoice 
price. If the district court finds that Burton lost sales by 
reason of the loss of the merchandise it should not attempt 
to quantify the inherently uncertain amount of the loss. 
Thus, unless Preston establishes that Burton did not lose 
any sales by reason of the loss of the 81 cases of cigarette 
papers, it will not have demonstrated that the court should 
deviate from the market value rule. 
 
In the circumstances, we will affirm the order of 
summary judgment entered on March 25, 1997, as to 
liability but will vacate the order with respect to the 
calculation of damages and will remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings to calculate damages 
in accordance with this opinion. The parties will bear their 
own costs on this appeal. 
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